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THE COSTS OF WRONGFUL-DISCHARGE LAWS
David H. Autor, John J. Donohue III, and Stewart J. Schwab*
Abstract—We estimate the effects on employment and wages of wrongful-
discharge protections adopted by U.S. state courts during the last three
decades. We find robust evidence that one wrongful-discharge doctrine,
the implied-contract exception, reduced state employment rates by 0.8%
to 1.7%. The initial impact is largest for female and less-educated workers
(those who change jobs frequently), while the longer-term effect is greater
for older and more-educated workers (those most likely to litigate). By
contrast, we find no robust employment or wage effects of two other
widely recognized wrongful-discharge laws: the public-policy and good-
faith exceptions.
I. Introduction
WHAT is the price of protection? This paper estimatesthe social costs, in possibly lower employment and
wages, of common-law protections designed to protect
American workers from wrongful discharge. Economic the-
ory suggests that employment protection is a double-edged
sword. It provides employment security to incumbent work-
ers but makes employers reluctant to hire, leading to a less
flexible labor market with potentially lower employment and
wages. It is frequently argued that the stagnant employment
performance of many European economies during the 1980s
and 1990s—“Eurosclerosis”—can be attributed in part to the
significant employment protection given European workers
[see Lazear (1990) and Blanchard and Wolfers (1999); Krueger
and Pischke (1998) provide a contrasting view]. Among the
obstacles to testing this hypothesis is the difficulty of making
reliable inferences using cross-country comparisons.
In this paper, we study the effects of employment protec-
tion in the United States. Numerous scholars have examined
the effects of American federal employment laws on em-
ployment and unemployment. Acemoglu and Angrist
(2001), DeLeire (2000), and Jolls and Prescott (2004)
present evidence that the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) decreased employment of disabled persons. Oyer
and Schaefer (2000, 2002) conclude that the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1991 increased the frequency of mass layoffs
and raised the returns to experience for workers who have a
downward-sloping age-litigation profile. Hahn, Todd, and
van der Klaauw (2001) also evaluate the costs of federal
antidiscrimination laws. A major hurdle for each of these
studies is that these federal statutes apply all at once to the
entire country. This makes it difficult to separate the effects
of the statute from all other changes occurring simulta-
neously (cf. Donohue, 1998; Donohue and Heckman,
1991).1
This paper overcomes this methodological challenge by
exploiting variation in the extent and timing of adoption of
employment protections across U.S. states. The United
States, uniquely in the industrialized world, has long had a
legal presumption that workers can be fired at will—that is,
“for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.”2 During the
1970s and 1980s, this presumption eroded rapidly: most
U.S. state courts created three classes of common-law
restrictions that limited employers’ ability to fire. These
exceptions garnered media headlines, created costly litiga-
tion, and—perhaps as importantly—generated substantial
uncertainty among employers about when they could termi-
nate workers with impunity. We refer to these common-law
exceptions as wrongful-discharge laws, and define their
precise meaning below.
Our empirical analysis is aided by the considerable vari-
ation across states in the timing and extent of their recog-
nition of wrongful-discharge laws. Three states—Florida,
Georgia, and Rhode Island—have never altered the
employment-at-will doctrine. Ten states now recognize each
of three broad classes of exception to the at-will doctrine:
the implied-contract, public policy, and good-faith excep-
tions. A few states have rejected prior adoptions (see ap-
pendix, table A1).3 We use this variation across states and
over time to analyze how wrongful-discharge laws affect
employment and earnings in state labor markets.
We are not the first to explore these effects. In a widely
cited line of research, Dertouzos and Karoly (1992, 1993)
used an instrumental variables framework to test whether
wrongful-discharge laws affected state-level employment.
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1 Chay (1998) circumvents this problem in looking at the impact of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which extended the federal
prohibition on discrimination to firms with 15–24 employees, by using the
variation across industries in the fraction of workers employed in firms
that would become subject to federal antidiscrimination law by virtue of
this legislative expansion. Jolls and Prescott (2004) use state variation in
disability laws existing prior to the adoption of the federal ADA to shed
light on the employment impact of the passage of the ADA.
2 This quotation is from Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad, Supreme
Court of Tennessee, 1884. Morriss (1994) provides a detailed history of
the employment-at-will doctrine.
3 To date, only Montana (in 1987) has passed a statute establishing a
good-causestandardforallemploymentterminations.Allotheremployment-
at-will exceptions are common-law doctrines, that is, case law. In 1991,
the Uniform Law Commissioners proposed a Model Employment Termi-
nation Act similar to the Montana statute, but no state has yet adopted it.
In 1996, the Arizona legislature passed a statute affirming employment at
will. Krueger (1991) provides an econometric study of the factors leading
state legislatures to consider statutory exceptions to the doctrine of
employment at will.
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They found surprisingly large impacts. Dertouzos and
Karoly estimate that states adopting a tort-based cause of
action (that is, one in which plaintiffs may sue employers
for full compensatory and punitive damages) suffered a 3%
reduction in aggregate state employment—roughly equiva-
lent to a 10% employer-side tax on wages—with an addi-
tional 1% or 2% employment decline for states also adopt-
ing a contract-based protection, that is, one in which
plaintiffs may sue only for economic losses.4 These findings
have not gone unchallenged. Morriss (1995) criticized Der-
touzos and Karoly’s legal variables. More recently, Miles
(2000) used a difference-in-differences approach to estimate
the impact of wrongful-discharge doctrines. He reports “no
statistically significant effects on either employment or
unemployment,” but does not comment on the source of the
discrepancy between his findings and those of Dertouzos
and Karoly.5
Our paper joins this debate by comprehensively reevalu-
ating the impacts of wrongful-discharge doctrines on em-
ployment and wages using richer data and a more complete
coding of the case law than previous work. As with Der-
touzos and Karoly’s and Miles’s studies, our key explana-
tory variables are the precedent-setting cases that establish
the wrongful-discharge laws recognized in each state and
time period. We differ from previous studies, however, in
using legal and employment data observed at monthly
intervals, in measuring wage as well as employment im-
pacts, and in exploring these impacts separately by educa-
tion and gender demographic subgroups over the short and
the longer term. We apply robust estimation techniques
throughout, and we validate our findings across time peri-
ods, outcome measures, and three distinct data sources.
Although we had anticipated that our reanalysis would
reconfirm the null hypothesis accepted by Miles, we instead
find a modest but robustly negative impact of one wrongful-
discharge doctrine—the implied-contract exception—on the
employment-to-population ratio in state labor markets. This
impact, which averages 0.8% to 1.6%, exists for all
education and gender groups, and is detectable among states
adopting at several time intervals during the sample. The
short-term impact is most pronounced for demographic
subgroups that change jobs most frequently: females, and
younger and less-educated workers. Over the longer term (4
to 7 years), however, the costs of implied-contract protec-
tion appear to be borne by older and more-educated work-
ers—those most likely to litigate. We find limited evidence
that the good-faith exception reduced state employment
levels by a similar magnitude, but this finding is not robust.
By contrast, we find no evidence that these legal doctrines
had any significant impact on workers’ wages. We therefore
conclude that the costs of these mandates appear to accrue
at the employment rather than the wage margin.6
Our companion paper, Autor, Donohue, and Schwab
(2004; ADS hereafter) demonstrates why prior studies have
reached opposing conclusions, ranging from no effect to
very large negative effects. Briefly summarized, ADS shows
that the exceedingly large disemployment effects estimated
by Dertouzos and Karoly—3 to 5 times the magnitude of
our estimates—appear driven by problematic instrumental
variables that are spuriously correlated with regional em-
ployment trends that substantially predate states’ adoption
of wrongful-discharge laws. By contrast, the discrepancies
with the methodologically similar study by Miles are ex-
plained by his reliance on a classification of case law
developed by Walsh and Schwarz (1996) that differs from
ours. As ADS details, Walsh-Schwarz classification neglects
to code the initial precedent-setting case law in a large
number of instances (20 of 94).7 By appropriately modify-
ing the Walsh-Schwarz classification, we find that Miles’s
results may be reconciled with our own.
II. Wrongful-Discharge Laws
A. Definition and Legal Significance
Since the heyday of employment at will in the early
twentieth century, legislatures, courts, and other market
institutions have repeatedly encroached on U.S. employers’
discretion to terminate workers at will. First, unions have
negotiated “just cause” contractual protection against firing
for their members.8 State legislatures have enacted broad
statutes constraining employers’ discretion to fire workers
belonging to “protected classes,” defined by race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, and union
4 Dertouzos, Holland, and Ebener (1988) earlier examined the direct
costs of wrongful-discharge litigation in California. They found these
direct costs to be modest, amounting to some $100 per termination. See
also Dertouzos and Karoly (1992, p. xi) (presenting findings of 1988
study).
5 In related work, Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) find that a state’s
adoption of wrongful-discharge doctrines significantly slows the job-to-
job flows of unemployed relative to employed workers. Autor (2003) and
Miles (2000) find that employers increased demand for temporary-help
agency employment when states adopted common-law exceptions to
employment at will.
6 A variety of studies find incomplete pass-through of employer man-
dates into wage levels, including Lazear (1990) and Fishback and Kantor
(1995). By contrast, Gruber (1994) finds that the cost of mandated
maternity benefits in the United States was entirely offset by a decline in
women’s wages.
7 This discrepancy reflects differences in the intended purposes for
which the legal classifications were developed. As described in section II,
our legal classification attempts to identify the first case in a state that
might trigger a client letter from attorneys warning about a change in law.
By contrast, Walsh and Schwarz select cases that best articulate courts’
rationales for promulgating a new doctrine. These cases often follow the
initial precedent-setting decision by several years.
8 Indeed, any employment contract for a specified term of years ordi-
narily cannot be terminated prior to the stipulated ending date without
some particularized showing of cause. See, for example, California Labor
Code §2924, which provides: “An employment for a specified term may
be terminated at any time by the employer in case of any willful breach of
duty by the employee in the course of his employment, or in case of his
habitual neglect of his duty or continued incapacity to perform it.”
Increasingly, high corporate executives are also signing contracts that
reward them with large severance payouts unless they are fired for gross
negligence, malfeasance, or some other act of serious misconduct.
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membership.9 Additional narrow statutes also bar termina-
tions for specific reasons, for example, to prevent pension
benefits from vesting or to retaliate against employees for
whistle-blowing or performing jury duty.10
Third, and central for this analysis, during the 1970s and
1980s the majority of U.S. state courts adopted one or more
common-law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine
that limited employers’ ability to fire. These are: (1) the tort
of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (public
policy exception); (2) the implied covenant to terminate
only in good faith and fair dealing (good-faith exception);
and (3) the implied-in-fact contract not to terminate without
good cause (implied-contract exception). We define these
exceptions in turn and discuss their significance.
First recognized by the California Supreme Court in
1959, the public policy exception gained widespread recog-
nition in the 1980s: 34 states adopted this exception be-
tween 1979 and 1994, and a total of 43 by 1999. The public
policy exception provides employees with protections
against discharges that would thwart an important public
policy, such as performing jury duty, filing a worker’s
compensation claim, reporting an employer’s wrongdoing,
or refusing to commit perjury.11 In the majority of states, the
public policy doctrine provides tort-based protection, mean-
ing that plaintiffs can sue for lost earnings, pain and suffer-
ing, and punitive damages. Despite its widespread recogni-
tion, successful cases—particularly those with multimillion-
dollar judgments—are rare. One reason is that courts
typically limit public policy cases to clear violations of
express legislative commands rather than violations of a
vaguer sense of public obligation. Accordingly, some legal
scholars have argued that the public policy doctrine is of
minor legal and economic significance (see Edelman, Abra-
ham, & Erlanger, 1992).
Like the public policy exception, the good-faith excep-
tion also prevents employers from firing workers for “bad
cause.” A leading example is the case of Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., where the employer fired a salesperson
just before a substantial commission was due.12 The court
found that the employer had deprived the plaintiff of the
“benefit of his bargain” and awarded compensatory and
punitive damages. Read broadly, the good-faith doctrine
could have sweeping consequences, serving as a general
prohibition against terminating any worker without just
cause (that is, economic necessity or poor performance). In
point of fact, the 11 state courts that currently recognize this
doctrine have primarily limited good-faith awards to timing
cases in which the employer intentionally deprives the
worker of a promised benefit, such as a sales commission or
pension benefit.13 Hence, like the public policy exception,
the good-faith doctrine has found relatively narrow appli-
cation.
Finally, 41 states recognize the implied-contract excep-
tion. This protection comes into force when an employer
implicitly promises not to terminate a worker without good
cause. A landmark decision establishing the implied-
contract exception was the 1980 case of Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, in which a dismissed worker success-
fully sued for breach of contract by citing an internal
personnel policy handbook stating that it was Blue Cross’s
policy to terminate employees only for just cause.14 The
court held that the handbook implied a binding contract, and
the worker was remunerated for breach of contract. An
equally influential 1981 California case, Pugh v. See’s Can-
dies, expanded the implied-contract notion by finding that
workers may be entitled to ongoing employment due to
longevity of service, a history of promotion or salary in-
creases, general company policies, or typical industry prac-
tices.15 In the subsequent five years, courts in 25 other states
adopted an implied-contract exception.
The expected employer costs of the implied-contract
exception are difficult to assess. Two factors limit employer
risk. First, implied-contract cases lead only to contractual
damages (that is, economic rather than punitive or full
compensatory damages), so spectacular jury awards are
unlikely.16 Second, employers can potentially insulate them-
selves from implied-contract claims by rewriting employ-
ment contracts and handbooks to state clearly that all
employment contracts are at will.17 On the other hand, the
factors creating an implied-contract claim are vaguer than
for a public policy claim, which likely contributes to
9 National Labor Relations Act §8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (enacted
1935) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of union status); Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e to 2000e-17 (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin);
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§621–634;
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§12101–12213.
10 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 §11, 29 U.S.C. 660(c)
(prohibiting discrimination against employees exercising rights under
OSHA); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §510, 29
U.S.C. §1140; New York Judiciary Law §519 (prohibiting discharge of
employee due to absence from employment for jury service).
11 As Schwab (1996) discusses, courts tend to apply this exception to the
at-will doctrine when the termination clearly affects third parties.
12 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
13 Many of the states that recognize the good-faith exception allow for
full tort compensatory and punitive damages, although California prom-
inently stopped doing so in the case Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). Oklahoma and New Hampshire previously recog-
nized good faith as a distinct action, but reversed their prior decisions in
1989 and 1980, respectively. During our period of study, California
recognized a very broad good-faith obligation (even with the Foley
holding that successful plaintiffs would be limited to receiving contract
damages). In Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000), after
our period of study, the court restricted good-faith claims primarily to
timing cases.
14 292 N.W.2d. 880 (Michigan, 1980).
15 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
16 Plaintiffs’ attorneys will often append claims for fraud or defamation
to their implied-contract complaints in an attempt to get before a jury on
a claim for punitive damages.
17 It remains a complex legal question, however, whether an employer
that once issued a handbook or other promise of job security can modify
it to create at-will employment. Several courts have held that such
unilateral changes by the employer are not binding on incumbent employ-
ees that have previously received promises of job security.
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employer uncertainty about the litigation risks entailed.18
Additionally, unlike the public policy and good-faith doc-
trines (as they have developed), the implied-contract doc-
trine can potentially reclassify an employer’s entire work-
force as not at will. In this case, the employer may terminate
its employees only for good cause—which is far more likely
to constrain employers than the specific “bad causes” pro-
hibited by the public policy and good-faith exceptions.19
Hence, paradoxically, the implied-contract doctrine is easier
to ‘contract around’ and potentially less costly per litigant
than other wrongful-discharge protections, yet is also more
sweeping.
Unfortunately, no comprehensive data exist on the num-
ber of outcome of wrongful-discharge cases under these
three doctrines.20 Several findings in the literature suggest,
however, that the implied-contract exception—and wrongful-
discharge laws more generally—may have changed em-
ployers’ hiring and termination practices. First, Miles
(2000) and Autor (2003) find that employers substantially
increased their use of temporary-help-agency workers
shortly after their states adopted implied-contract excep-
tions. Second, Kugler and Saint Paul (2004) find that the
hiring odds of unemployed workers declined after courts in
their states recognized wrongful-discharge protections, par-
ticularly the implied-contract exception. Third, sales of
employment practices liability insurance (EPLI) policies,
which insure employers against litigation risk, became
widespread in the 1990s. Although EPLI shields employers
from liability under both federal antidiscrimination (and
other) statutes and state common-law wrongful-discharge
protections, an authority on EPLI interviewed for this re-
search averred that “how protective wrongful-discharge
laws are in a particular state is an important factor in setting
EPLI premiums.”21 This suggests that wrongful-discharge
laws impose real costs.
B. Hypothesized Effects on the Labor Market
As discussed by Lazear (1990) and Blanchard and Katz
(1997), the theoretical effect of firing restrictions on
employment levels is ambiguous. In a frictionless labor
market, the Coase theorem predicts that imposition of
employer-side firing costs will be fully undone by effi-
cient worker-firm bargains; for example, workers would
post a bond equal to the firing cost. Where the Coasean
result does not hold, firing costs reduce employers’ in-
centives to hire new workers and to fire incumbent
workers (Donohue, 1989). This dampens employment
fluctuations, which can raise or lower employment levels
in the short term. Over the longer term, if employment
protections raise employment costs without yielding cor-
responding productivity increases, a simple supply-and-
demand model would predict that employment levels
and/or wages are likely to fall. This effect is exacerbated
if firing restrictions encourage workers to engage in
rent-seeking (that is, nonmeritorious) litigation or induce
employers to retain unproductive workers to avoid liti-
gation.
Not all (non-Coasean) employment protection de-
grades labor market efficiency, however. Employment
protection can be viewed as a mandated employment
benefit that, while costly for employers to provide, is also
valued by employees (Summers, 1989). By raising em-
ployer costs, mandated employment protection shifts la-
bor demand inward. But to the degree that workers value
the mandated benefit, labor supply simultaneously shifts
outward, muting the adverse employment impact. If em-
ployees value the benefit at its full marginal cost, wages
will in theory fall to cover the cost of providing the
benefit, and employment levels will be unaffected (see,
for example, Gruber, 1994).22
Although the overall impact of erosions of the at-will
doctrine on employment or unemployment is not clear a
priori, existing evidence suggests that the impact may differ
for different groups of workers. Several studies find that the
employment of younger, less-educated workers appears
most likely to be harmed by wrongful-discharge protections,
while older and more-educated workers appear to benefit
(OECD, 1999, 2004; Jolls, 2000; Bertola, Blau, & Kahn,
2002). We examine these disparate impacts in depth below
and find important differences by demographic group that
depend on the time horizon examined.
III. Data Sources and Model Specification
A. Data Sources
To measure employment and earnings, we draw on the
complete Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly files
for the years 1978 to 1999. The CPS provides individual
labor force data for approximately 100,000 adults per sur-
vey month starting in 1978 and contains wage data for
18 Schwab (1993) offers a unified framework for interpreting implied-
contract cases.
19 The legal consequences of an implied contract are not always identical
to those of an actual contract. For example, a worker who is covered by
an explicit good-cause provision who is terminated for, say, harassing a
fellow worker will prevail if the jury believes the harassment did not
occur. In an implied-contract case, however, courts frequently hold that
the discharged worker cannot prevail without showing that the employer
did not reasonably believe the harassment occurred, thereby protecting
reasonable judgments made by employers in good faith. Cotran v. Rollins
Hudig Hall International, Inc., 17 Cal.4th 93 (1998).
20 Nor would these caseload data provide a full measure of the economic
costs of wrongful-discharge laws, for the observed caseload is an equi-
librium function of employer decisions to avert or settle suits and em-
ployee incentives to file suits.
21 Interview with Richard S. Betterley, publisher of the Betterley Report,
a leading survey of EPLI insurance carriers (January 23, 2004).
22 Moreover, as several authors have argued, adverse selection in labor
markets may cause employers to provide inefficiently low levels of job
security (Aghion & Hermalin, 1990; Levine, 1991). Restrictions on firing
could therefore raise employment while reducing wages. This would
correspond to a case where workers value job security more at the margin
than it costs employers to provide.
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one-quarter of the employed subsample beginning in
1979.23 We calculate employment-to-population ratios by
state, month, and year, and use micro data on hourly
earnings in models for hourly wages. In some analyses, we
also present results for eight demographic subgroups distin-
guished by gender, education, and age. In section VI, we
verify the CPS-based employment results using independent
data from the Current Employment Statistics (CES). The
CES data offer a longer time series but lower precision.
To maximize usable variation in the timing of the adop-
tion of wrongful-discharge laws, we code the legal and
employment variables at monthly frequency, as done by
Morriss (1995). Hence, if two states adopt a wrongful-
discharge doctrine 11 months apart within the same calendar
year, our estimates take accurate account of this substantial
difference in timing. Because the outcome data are observed
at high frequency, serial correlation is a major concern.
Following the recommendations of Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan (2004), we compute standard errors using the
generalized Huber-White formula clustered by state. This
allows for arbitrary error correlations among state-month
observations.24 In addition, we focus our analysis on rela-
tively short pre-post intervals surrounding law adoption to
isolate discrete effects on labor market outcomes.
For our legal variables, we developed a taxonomy of
wrongful-discharge law prevailing in each state and month-
year for the three-decade period from 1970 to 1999. As
Morriss (1995) discusses, it is not always easy to date when
a state has adopted a particular at-will exception. Our
objective is easily stated, however.We envision management-
side employment lawyers reading the advance sheets and
writing awareness letters to their clients when major
changes occur in the common law. Thus, we are interested
in the first court decision in a state that would trigger a client
letter warning about a law change. In practice, we looked
for the first major appellate-court decision (either the inter-
mediate court or the state supreme court) that signaled the
sustained adoption of the particular at-will exception. Thus,
a lower court decision adopting an exception that was
reversed on appeal would not be counted, but a supreme
court decision or lower court decision not reversed would be
counted. As it turned out, our independent assessment of the
legal doctrines for the 50 states largely agrees with Mor-
riss’s list of relevant cases, which we update to 1999.25 Our
companion paper ADS shows that our findings are robust to
the choice of the alternative legal classifications developed
by Dertouzos and Karoly (1992) and Morriss (1995).26
B. Model Specification
Because state courts adopted the common-law wrongful-
discharge doctrines in different months and years during the
1980s and 1990s, we have potentially many “experiments”
to exploit. Our empirical approach contrasts the change in
employment and wages in states adopting a given wrongful-
discharge doctrine in a given period with that in states not
adopting any doctrine during the same time period.
To implement this difference-in-differences design, we
must select a pre and a post period for each contrast.
Although we could use the entire 1978–1999 panel to
calculate these contrasts, that has two disadvantages. First,
because states adopted exceptions in the first year of our
1978–1999 CPS data set and as late as 1998, the long-panel
approach implies that for some states, observations from
two decades before or after adoption would be used to form
a pre-post contrast. This is unappealing. Second, the long-
panel approach exacerbates the serial correlation problem
noted above.
To mitigate these problems, we use as a baseline a
five-year pre-post window: the 24 calendar months prior to
adoption of a doctrine are designated as the pre period;
months 13 to 36 following adoption are designated as the
post period; and to allow for an adjustment interval, the first
12 months immediately following adoption are excluded
from the sample. We later explore the sensitivity of our
results to this set of choices by contrasting estimated short-
and long-term labor market impacts. To form a control
sample of nonadopting states, we include the maximal set of
state-month observations for corresponding calendar
months for states that did not adopt any of the three
doctrines during the relevant pre- or posttreatment time
interval. This design implies that some states serve as
treatment states in one period and control states in another,
although never within a five-year window surrounding treat-
ment.27
23 Individuals may appear up to four times in one calendar year in the
employment sample (not the wage sample), though their labor force status
may differ on each occasion. Our estimation procedure takes account of
potential serial correlation among observations within each state sample.
24 Specifically, the estimator for the variance-covariance matrix is given
by
W  VV1 j1N ujuj VV1,
where N is the total number of states, V is the matrix of independent
variables, and uj is defined for each state to be
uj  t1T ejtvjt,
where ejt is the estimated residual for state i at time t, and vjt is a row vector
of dependent variables (including the constant). This procedure is imple-
mented in Stata software using the “cluster” command (clustering on
state).
25 Although we use the three-part division of the at-will exceptions in the
body of our analysis, we also explored the relevance of the tort contract
distinction on which Dertouzas and Karoly (1992) focus. We did not find
this distinction to be relevant or empirically robust.
26 As discussed in the introduction, the Walsh-Schwarz (1996) classifi-
cation used by Miles (2000) yields much weaker results. In ADS, we trace
this to the fact that Walsh and Schwarz do not necessarily code the
precedent-setting state cases but instead select the (typically later) cases
that provide the clearest articulation of the newly adopted doctrines.
27 For example, Maryland adopted the implied-contract exception in
January of 1985, so the window of time around the commencement of
treatment that enters our analysis begins at January 1983 (24 months
before adoption) and continues through December 1987 (36 months after
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Our basic econometric model is
Yst    1Treatst  2Postst
(1)
 3TreatstPostst εst,
where Treatst is an indicator for the period from 24 months
before to 36 months after adoption of a wrongful-discharge
law in state s, and Postst is an indicator for the period 13
through 36 months after adoption. The coefficient of interest
in this equation, 3, is an estimate of the pre-post change in
the outcome variable in adopting states relative to the
corresponding change in nonadopting states. All estimates
are weighted by the share of national residents aged 18–64
in each state-year cell.28
We enrich this basic model in three ways. First, in place
of the common main-effect and pretreatment indicators (
and Treatst), we add main effects for each state and their
interactions with a treatment indicator variable. Second, to
control flexibly for common shocks to national employ-
ment, we include an exhaustive set of time dummies,
corresponding to each year and month of the sample. Fi-
nally, to allow for common regional employment shocks,
we also estimate specifications that include interactions
between calendar-year dummies and indicator variables
denoting the four major Census geographic regions. With
region controls included, the parameter  is identified by
contrasting contemporaneous employment or wage out-
comes in adopting versus nonadopting states located in the
same geographic regions.29
IV. Impacts on Employment and Earnings
Before turning to estimates of equation (1), we provide a
visual summary of the employment data in figures 1 through
3. These figures plot estimated log employment-
to-population ratios in adopting relative to nonadopting
states at monthly intervals in the 4 years prior through the 8
years following the adoption of each doctrine. Employment
levels in the first full month following adoption are normal-
ized at 0, and the dashed lines in each figure represent robust
90% confidence intervals (allowing for arbitrary within-
state error correlations) for each monthly point estimate.30
These figures provide initial evidence that one wrongful-
discharge doctrine, the implied-contract exception, did in-
deed affect state employment levels. As is visible in figure
1, relative (log) employment-to-population ratios for both
adoption). Observations for January 1983 to December 1984 form the
Maryland pretreatment sample, and observations from January 1986 to
December 1987 form the Maryland posttreatment sample. As control
states, we use all observations from other state-months that were not
assigned to treatment during January 1983 through December 1987. Our
model compares the change in the dependent variable in the treatment
states across the pre and post periods to the change over the same years in
the control states. Starting in January 1988, Maryland may reenter the
control sample for later-treated states.
28 We weight by population shares rather than population counts to avoid
inadvertently placing greater weight on later observations due to growing
national population.
29 Because, as noted previously, treated states may contribute control
observations 36 months after a law is adopted, the version of equation (1)
that we implement is slightly richer. For each state that reenters the
sample, we additionally add a post-post dummy for the posttreatment
period (that is, months 37 following law adoption). Hence, the version
of equation (1) implemented is
Yst  	s  	s  Treatst  1Postst  2TreatstPostst
 3Postpostst  
t  εst,
where 	s and 
t are vectors of state and time dummies. As a check on this
specification, we estimate in the appendix (table A2) a set of models that
restrict treated states from reentering the control sample 37 months
following treatment. The results in table A2 are nearly identical to those
in table 1.
30 Specifically, the figures plot the coefficient and 90% confidence bands
from estimates of parameters 	 from the following equation:
Yst  
s  t  4896 	Ls,t  εst,
where, as above, Yst is the natural logarithm of the estimated employment-
to-population ratio in state and time period s and t; 
s and t are vectors
of state and time main effects; and Lst is a dummy variable that assumes
the value of 1 (only) in the month that a state adopts a given doctrine (the
impact of each doctrine is estimated simultaneously). Huber-White stan-
dard errors allow for arbitrary error correlations within states.
FIGURE 1.—STATE LOG EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIOS BEFORE AND
AFTER ADOPTION OF IMPLIED-CONTRACT EXCEPTION: MONTHLY LEADS AND
LAGS FROM 4 YEARS BEFORE TO 8 YEARS AFTER ADOPTION
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males and females dip by approximately 1.5% to 2% over
the 2 years following adoption of the implied-contract
exception, reaching a nadir after approximately 24 to 30
months. By contrast, figures 2 and 3 provide little evidence
that the public policy or good-faith exceptions affected
employment levels. One should not make strong inferences
from these figures, however. As is visible from the wide
standard-error bands, the monthly point estimates are rather
noisy. In addition, these models do not include the full set of
controls that we later use for estimating equation (1). Nev-
ertheless, the formal analysis of employment below largely
bears out the impression given by the figures.31
A. Initial Estimates: Employment and Wages
The first panel of table 1 presents estimates of equation
(1) for employment. What emerges clearly is that adoption
of the implied-contract exception is associated with a mod-
est but meaningful reduction in employment. In column 1 of
panel A, we estimate that adoption of the implied-contract
doctrine reduces the overall employment-to-population ratio
by 1.7 log points in the second and third years following
adoption (t  3.1).32 Adding dummies to absorb region-by-
year employment shocks reduces the absolute magnitude of
this point estimate only slightly, to 1.6 log points, and it
remains highly significant (t  3.5).
The next two rows of the table repeat these estimates for
the public policy and good-faith doctrines. The public pol-
icy doctrine is associated with a small reduction in employ-
ment, but this is never significant. The point estimates for
the good-faith doctrine indicate larger employment reduc-
tions—in the range of 0.4 to 0.6 log points—but these are
also statistically insignificant. The low precision of the
good-faith point estimates likely reflects the fact that there
are fewer adoptions of the good-faith doctrine than of the
31 We do not provide comparable plots for wage levels, because figures
(and regression estimates in subsequent tables) show no evidence of a
wage impact.
32 We use the term log point to refer to a 0.01 change in the natural
logarithm of the outcome measure. For the small effects measured here,
log points are approximately equal to percentage points (equal to exp[log
points]  1).
FIGURE 2.—STATE LOG EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIOS BEFORE AND
AFTER ADOPTION OF PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION: MONTHLY LEADS AND
LAGS FROM 4 YEARS BEFORE TO 8 YEARS AFTER ADOPTION
FIGURE 3.—STATE LOG EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIOS BEFORE AND
AFTER ADOPTION OF GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION: MONTHLY LEADS AND LAGS
FROM 4 YEARS BEFORE TO 8 YEARS AFTER ADOPTION
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other exceptions: 10 for good faith versus 36 and 34 for
implied contract and public policy.33
To confirm that these results are not driven by sectoral
trends, subsequent columns tabulate models estimated sep-
arately for manufacturing and nonmanufacturing employ-
ment. In these models, the included time and region dum-
mies implicitly account for sector-specific (manufacturing
versus nonmanufacturing) shocks that could potentially in-
duce bias.34 These models find significant negative effects
of the implied-contract doctrine on both manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing employment. The point estimate for
manufacturing employment is substantially larger than for
nonmanufacturing (3.0% versus 1.1%), but also esti-
mated with substantially lower precision, due to the smaller
scale and greater variability of manufacturing employment;
hence, these point estimates are not significantly different at
the 5% level. We again find no significant effect of the
public-policy doctrine on employment. By contrast, the
good-faith doctrine is associated with a large rise in manu-
facturing employment and a substantial decline in non-
manufacturing employment. These effects appear driven by
regional shocks, however. Neither point estimate proves
robust to inclusion of region-by-year dummies.35
Panel B of table 1 presents comparable estimates for the
impact of wrongful-discharge doctrines on log hourly earn-
ings of employed workers. For these models, we fit the
equation
wijst  4Treatst  5Postst  6TreatstPostst
(2)
 	s 
t j εijst,
where w is 100 times the log hourly wage of individual i
belonging to demographic group j in state s and year-month
t. In addition to the state and time effects used above, these
models also include a vector of dummy variables, j,
indicating membership in each of eight demographic groups
[(female vs. male)  (ages 18–39 vs. 40–54)  (education
33 Although a total of 43, 43, and 13 implied-contract, public policy, and
good-faith exceptions were adopted, not all occur in our sample window.
We analyze a longer sample frame in table 6.
34 The dependent variable in these models is the logarithm of the ratio of
employment in the sector (manufacturing or nonmanufacturing) to the
total state population aged 16–64. Models that instead use the logarithm of
sectoral employment with no denominator yield comparable results.
35 On the theory that costly employment protections may cause workers
to substitute to the unprotected sector, we also estimated models for
self-employment rates by state and month (estimates available from the
authors). In contrast to expectations, the signs of the point estimates for
the self-employment outcome are in most cases equal to those for overall
employment, suggesting no substitution (and perhaps indicating that
self-employment and formal employment are complements). However,
these estimates are in all cases economically small and statistically
insignificant. We are not able to estimate comparable models for wages,
because self-employed workers do not report earnings in the CPS samples.
TABLE 1.— DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LAWS ON STATE EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIO AND
HOURLY EARNINGS: CONTRASTING OUTCOMES IN YEARS 2 AND 3 FOLLOWING ADOPTION WITH YEARS 1 AND 2 PRECEDING ADOPTION
Exception
A. 100  In(Employment/Population): 1978–1999 B. 100  In(Hourly Wage): 1979–1999
All Employment Manufacturing Nonmanufacturing All Employment Manufacturing Nonmanufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Implied 1.72 1.59 3.04 2.89 1.10 1.18 0.54 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.60 0.49
contract (0.55) (0.45) (1.87) (1.54) (0.84) (0.504) (0.84) (0.76) (0.71) (0.65) (0.96) (0.84)
R2 0.870 0.894 0.932 0.944 0.926 0.944 0.234 0.235 0.320 0.321 0.220 0.221
n 7,511 7,511 7,511 1,898,114 394,658 1,503,456
Public policy 0.23 0.07 1.75 0.12 0.65 0.01 0.69 0.51 0.18 0.25 0.99 0.84
(0.80) (0.59) (1.91) (1.62) (0.89) (0.60) (0.56) (0.57) (0.71) (0.53) (0.62) (0.63)
R2 0.848 0.875 0.935 0.944 0.918 0.936 0.233 0.233 0.321 0.322 0.219 0.219
n 7,863 7,863 7,863 1,946,943 400,133 1,546,810
Good faith 0.37 0.63 5.62 1.71 1.88 0.45 1.28 0.37 2.22 1.70 1.28 0.18
(0.61) (0.88) (1.92) (2.55) (0.79) (1.02) (1.44) (1.79) (1.22) (1.43) (1.59) (1.84)
R2 0.852 0.883 0.929 0.941 0.916 0.935 0.229 0.230 0.310 0.311 0.216 0.217
n 7,523 7,523 7,523 1,883,260 378,217 1,505,043
Region  year
dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel A: Each entry is from a separate weighted OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the log of the state-month ratio of employment (in the designated sector) to population for residents aged 16–64
in 50 U.S. states. Employment is estimated from complete combined Current Population Survey monthly files for 1978–1999. All models include state main effects and indicators for each yearmonth in the sample.
Models in even-numbered columns also include interactions between four Census-region dummies and individual calendar year dummies. Models are weighted by state’s share of national population aged 16–64
in each month-year using CPS sampling weights. Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states.
Panel B: Each entry is from a separate weighted OLS regression of log real hourly earnings of currently employed (wage or salary) non-self-employed workers aged 16–64. Wages are calculated from the Current
Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group files for 1979–1999 as the log of usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours. Top-coded observations are multiplied by 1.5, and wages below $1.50
or above $100 per hour in real 2000 dollars (using the personal consumption expenditure deflator) are discarded. All models include state main effects, dummy variables for each yearmonth in the sample, and
dummies for eight demographic groups: (male vs. female)  (high school or less vs. some college or more)  (ages 16–39 vs. 40–64). Models in even-numbered columns also include interactions between four
Census-region dummies and individual calendar year dummies. Regressions are weighted by CPS earnings weights. Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlations across
observations within states.
Treatment sample in each panel includes observations for 1–24 months prior to and 13–36 months following adoption of relevant doctrine in adopting states (months 0–12 following adoption are omitted). Control
sample includes maximal set of observations for corresponding calendar months from states that did not adopt any of the three doctrines during the relevant pre- or posttreatment time interval. The coefficient reported
is the interaction between treatment status (that is, adopting a doctrine) and an indicator for 13–36 months after adoption.
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high school or less vs. at least some college)]. Standard
errors are clustered by state, as above.36
These estimates yield no evidence that wrongful-
discharge doctrines affected earnings of employed workers.
For the implied-contract and public policy doctrines, point
estimates are uniformly small, precisely estimated, and very
far from significant. The point estimates for the good-faith
doctrine are uniformly negative and in some cases large, in
the range 1.2% to 2.2%. But these point estimates are
also insignificant, and their magnitude is substantially re-
duced by inclusion of region effects.
As noted earlier, treated states—that is, those that adopted
a law during our sample period—may contribute observa-
tions to the control group starting 36 months following law
adoption. To provide a check on any potential bias induced
by this procedure, we present in the appendix (table A2) a
version of the table 1 models where treated states do not
enter the control sample. These models produce near-
identical estimates to our main results in table 1, suggesting
that our procedure increases efficiency without inducing
bias.
B. Does the Specific Doctrine Matter?
Given the generally negative estimated impact of each
category of doctrine on employment levels, one potential
interpretation of these results is that it is not the specific
doctrine that matters, but simply whether the state has
adopted any wrongful-discharge doctrine. To examine this
issue, we estimate in table 2 a set of models that compares
the impacts of an any-doctrine variable with a disaggregated
set of three doctrine variables. As with the previous models,
we specify the two-year period prior to law change as the
pretreatment period and the two-year period commencing
one year after law change as the posttreatment period.37
The first two columns of table 2, panel A, confirm that, on
average, states adopting any exception to employment at
will experienced an employment reduction of approxi-
mately 0.6% in the two years following adoption (not
significant in either specification). Columns 3 and 4 replace
36 As in the employment models, we also include a post-post dummy
variable for state-month observations where a state was previously treated
and reenters the sample as a control observation.
37 An additional wrinkle in this specification is that several states adopt
multiple doctrines within a five-year window and hence the pre and post
periods are not unique. In estimating these models, we include all relevant
pre- and posttreatment observations for a given state—meaning that some
treatment and control periods overlap—and include, as in equation (1),
treatment and treatment  post effects for each doctrine. Control obser-
vations are selected identically to the table 1 models.
TABLE 2.—DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF WRONGFUL-DISCHARGE LAWS ON EMPLOYMENT AND HOURLY WAGES, 1978–1999:
CONTRASTING THE IMPACT OF ANY DOCTRINE VERSUS SPECIFIC DOCTRINES
Doctrine
All Industries Manufacturing Nonmanufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A. 100  In(Employment/Population), 1978–1999
Any doctrine 0.75 0.63 0.53 0.38 0.97 0.63
(0.55) (0.40) (1.24) (1.06) (0.70) (0.43)
Implied contract 1.63 1.44 3.32 2.52 0.96 1.14
(0.55) (0.45) (1.57) (1.38) (0.73) (0.55)
Public policy 0.18 0.10 1.61 0.29 0.58 0.07
(0.67) (0.46) (1.72) (1.47) (0.75) (0.49)
Good faith 0.72 0.73 4.98 1.88 2.42 0.96
(0.56) (0.62) (1.69) (1.67) (0.75) (0.66)
R2 0.845 0.877 0.853 0.880 0.922 0.937 0.926 0.938 0.911 0.935 0.917 0.936
n 10,465 10,465 10,465
Region  year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
B. 100  In(Hourly Wage), 1979–1999
Any doctrine 0.26 0.44 0.75 0.66 0.16 0.37
(0.60) (0.62) (0.55) (0.50) (0.67) (0.69)
Implied contract 0.75 0.49 0.71 0.55 0.86 0.58
(0.81) (0.72) (0.72) (0.63) (0.91) (0.78)
Public policy 1.11 0.25 0.01 0.63 1.47 0.59
(0.70) (0.58) (0.76) (0.58) (0.77) (0.64)
Good faith 0.76 0.01 1.98 1.54 0.63 0.29
(1.32) (1.67) (1.25) (1.15) (1.51) (1.78)
R2 0.232 0.232 0.232 0.232 0.310 0.316 0.315 0.316 0.218 0.219 0.218 0.219
n 2,551,552 518,317 2,033,235
Region  year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlation within states. Dependent variables, samples, and weights are as in table 1, panels A and B. Coefficients reported are the
interactions between treatment status (that is, adopting any doctrine or a specific doctrine) and an indicator for 13–36 months after adoption.
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the any-doctrine dummy with indicators for each of the
three legal doctrines. When their effects are estimated
jointly, only the implied-contract doctrine is statistically
significant, and its point estimate is close to that in the prior
table. The public policy and good-faith doctrines are insig-
nificant in all specifications.
Subsequent columns, which repeat these estimates for
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors, reinforce the
earlier conclusions. The any-doctrine dummy is never sig-
nificant by itself, whereas the implied-contract doctrine is
significant in all but one specification (column 11). The
good-faith estimates are again opposite-signed for manufac-
turing and nonmanufacturing and, as before, are not robust
to inclusion of region effects. In sum, the implied-contract
doctrine is the only wrongful-discharge law that appears to
have a robust negative effect on employment.
We next estimate a variant of equation (2) for wages
where the effects of all three laws are estimated simulta-
neously. These results are found in panel B of table 2. As in
table 1, the estimated effect on wages of the implied-
contract exception is seen to be small and insignificant,
albeit positive. When region controls are included, none of
the point estimates in this table is statistically significant,
suggesting that either the wrongful-discharge doctrines had
no robust wage effects, or that these effects are too small to
detect.38
C. Estimates by Subperiod: A Consistency Check
The preceding estimates pool all years of data to increase
the precision of the estimates. The cost of this approach is
that it masks any temporal heterogeneity in the economic
impact of the doctrines. Table 3 studies this potential het-
erogeneity by tabulating the effect of each exception on
employment for the following adoption cohorts: 1980 to
1983, 1984 to 1987, 1988 to 1992, and 1993 to 1998.39
As the first row of table 3 shows, the 15 states that
adopted the implied-contract exception during 1980 to 1983
experienced a decline of 0.9% to 1.6% in employment
during months 13 through 36 following adoption (the
smaller estimate corresponding to the model with region-
by-year controls). The 18 states that adopted this exception
between 1984 and 1987 also experienced similarly large
employment declines. For the final set of states that adopted
the doctrine between 1988 and 1992, we also find a simi-
larly negative employment effect (1.8%). This point esti-
mate is not significant at conventional levels, perhaps be-
cause only three states adopt the implied-contract doctrine
in this period.
The next four columns of table 3 repeat these estimates
for states adopting the public-policy and good-faith excep-
tions. In almost half of these regressions, the coefficient
estimates are smaller than their accompanying standard
errors. For the other half, the estimated effects swing wildly
in sign and magnitude for each doctrine and time period.
This suggests either that these doctrines affect employment
inconsistently or, perhaps more plausibly, that their passage
is confounded with other significant shocks to employment.
By contrast, the consistency of the results for the implied-
contract doctrine (across time periods and, in table 2, across
sectors) increases our confidence that this doctrine did have
a modest but robust causal depressing effect on state em-
ployment rates.40
D. Alternative Timing Assumptions
Thus far, we have relied on our baseline specification,
which uses the 24 months prior to adoption as the pretreat-
ment period and the months 13 to 36 following adoption as
the posttreatment period. In table 4, we explore the sensi-
tivity of our findings to alternative choices of pre and post
periods, and additionally measure the longer-term impacts
of the wrongful-discharge doctrines. For reference, the first
two columns of table 4 repeat our baseline specification for
employment from table 2 (columns 1 and 2). Columns 3
through 10 move the postadoption treatment window closer
to the point of adoption by 1 year (that is, immediately
thereafter) and then outward by 2, 4, and 6 years respec-
tively.
As with prior estimates, these sensitivity tests indicate
that the public policy doctrine is never significant, and that
the good-faith doctrine is typically insignificant and never
robust to inclusion of region effects. By contrast, varying
the postadoption comparison period produces a noteworthy
pattern of coefficients for the implied-contract doctrine. We
38 One further possibility is that wage estimates may suffer from com-
position bias if, for example, wrongful-discharge laws price low-wage
workers out of the labor market. The positive, but insignificant, wage
coefficients for the implied-contract exception may be suggestive of such
bias, if this legal change dampens employment in a way that dispropor-
tionately impacts low-wage workers. To evaluate this bias, we followed
Neal and Johnson (1996) and Chandra (2003) in estimating models for
impacts on median wages for all potential workers, including the nonem-
ployed. To perform these estimates, we assigned nonworkers an arbitrarily
low wage, thereby assuming that their potential earnings are below the
median wage in their respective state-time-demographic group cell. Be-
cause this restriction excludes many female workers—and because we
were not confident in the behavioral assumption that low-earnings females
are least likely to participate (see Neal, 2004)—we limited our analysis of
median wage estimates to males, few of whom are affected by the 50%
restriction. We generally find that estimates of the effects of wrongful-
discharge laws on median wages are less positive when nonearners are
included in the sample than when they are excluded, suggesting that
wrongful-discharge laws reduce the participation of workers in low-
earnings cells. However, we found no robust negative effects of wrongful-
discharge laws on wage levels in these models. A table of estimates is
available from us.
39 Adoption cohort dates refer to the year a wrongful-discharge doctrine
is enacted. As with prior estimates, the pre and post periods used to form
the employment contrast are the surrounding five years (two prior to
adoption, three after adoption with the first omitted). To allow for the
two-year pretreatment period, we do not study adoptions prior to 1980. No
state adopted an implied-contract or public policy exception after 1992.
40 Because strong regional patterns exist in adoptions of the wrongful-
discharge doctrine (discussed in ADS), we also estimated the table 3
employment models separately for Southern and non-Southern states. In
both regions, we find robust evidence that the implied-contract exception
reduced employment-to-population ratios by 1.3 to 1.8 log points.
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TABLE 3.—DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF WRONGFUL-DISCHARGE LAWS ON EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIOS: ESTIMATES BY
ADOPTER COHORTS, 1978–1999*
Implied Contract Public Policy Good Faith
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
1980–1983
1.56 0.94 0.35 0.69 0.14 0.10
(0.63) (0.40) (0.88) (0.75) (0.58) (0.61)
R2 0.875 0.887 0.864 0.876 0.871 0.882
n 3,334 3,180 2,564
States adopting 15 11 4
1984–1987
1.56 1.47 1.39 0.85 3.10 2.50
(1.11) (0.78) (1.01) (0.87) (0.71) (0.81)
R2 0.905 0.914 0.896 0.904 0.905 0.912
n 3,191 3,168 1,813
States adopting 18 17 3
1988–1992
1.79 1.81 2.21 1.05 2.08 2.77
(1.45) (1.46) (0.66) (0.55) (0.55) (0.94)
R2 0.854 0.888 0.853 0.881 0.857 0.887
n 3,160 3,850 2,944
States adopting 3 6 2
1993–1996
n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.02 0.14
(0.20) (0.28)
R2 0.905 0.909
n 2,308
States adopting 0 0 1
Region  year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
*Dependent variable: 100  In(employment/population).
Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlation within states. Dependent variables, specifications, and weights are identical to table 1.
TABLE 4.— DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF WRONGFUL-DISCHARGE LAWS ON LOG EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIOS FOR YEARS
1978–1999: TESTING SENSITIVITY TO SELECTION OF PRE- AND POST-ADOPTION TREATMENT PERIODS*
Pre period:
Baseline
Yrs 2 and 1 Yrs 2 and 1 Yrs 2 and 1 Yrs 2 and 1 Yrs 2 and 1 Yrs 3 and 2 Yrs 4 and 3
Post period:
Yrs 1 and 2 Yrs 0 and 1 Yrs 2 and 3 Yrs 4 and 5 Yrs 6 and 7 Yrs 1 and 2 Yrs 1 and 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Implied 1.63 1.44 1.10 0.94 1.59 1.51 1.24 1.36 0.52 0.83 1.68 1.45 1.58 1.32
contract (0.55) (0.45) (0.46) (0.36) (0.56) (0.54) (0.66) (0.66) (0.71) (0.66) (0.68) (0.56) (0.84) (0.74)
Public policy 0.18 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.21 0.19 0.78 0.17 0.26 0.19 0.28 0.18
(0.67) (0.46) (0.43) (0.32) (0.80) (0.56) (0.87) (0.57) (0.87) (0.52) (0.81) (0.57) (0.87) (0.66)
Good faith 0.72 0.73 0.39 0.38 1.35 1.30 1.03 0.71 0.94 0.88 0.38 0.59 0.33 0.70
(0.56) (0.62) (0.40) (0.42) (0.58) (0.69) (0.69) (0.79) (0.96) (1.03) (0.66) (0.77) (0.97) (1.06)
R2 0.853 0.880 0.853 0.879 0.852 0.880 0.859 0.887 0.864 0.891 0.851 0.879 0.851 0.880
n 10,465 10,633 10,425 10,497 9,340 9,964 9,527
Region  year
dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
*Dependent variable: 100  In(employment/population)
Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlation within states. Samples, specifications, and weights are identical to table 2 except, as noted, varying selection of pre- and
posttreatment intervals surrounding law adoption.
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find that the disemployment effect of this exception appears
to reach a maximum at 2 to 3 years following adoption, and
then gradually decays. By years 6 and 7, the estimated
employment reduction is approximately one-half the size of
the baseline and is insignificant (a pattern also suggested by
figure 1).
What explains this reconvergence between adopting and
nonadopting states? One possibility is that it is a statistical
artifact: because the vast majority of states adopted the
implied-contract exception by the end of our sample, rela-
tively few pure control states—that is, those yet to have
adopted the implied-contract exception—are available to
form a contrast toward the end of the sample. Alternatively,
reconvergence could exist if employers either originally
overestimated the costs of the implied-contract doctrine or
over time learned how to minimize them. Given the initial
uncertainty about the ultimate contours of the legal rules
that would emerge after they were first introduced, it would
not be surprising that employers would overreact to these
judicial innovations, as suggested by the legal analysis of
Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger (1992). Moreover, the
overreaction hypothesis is buttressed by the evidence that
professional (nonacademic) law journals and personnel
journals overstated the threat posed by the implied-contract
doctrine, which in itself would lead employers to react
excessively.41 If, over the longer term, businesses discov-
ered that the laws did not substantially raise employment
costs, this effect would likely have abated. If, however, the
initial costs were real, it is still possible that firms would
learn better how to avoid creating implied contracts—
perhaps by having all new employees sign forms acknowl-
edging their at-will status—thereby reducing these costs
after six or seven years.
The final columns of table 4 test the sensitivity of the
employment results to the selection of the pretreatment
period. By moving the pretreatment interval backward from
the date of adoption, we check against the possibility that
wrongful-discharge doctrines were adopted at cyclical em-
ployment peaks, thereby leading us to falsely attribute
postpeak employment declines to the doctrines rather than
the business cycle. Columns 11 and 12 compare employ-
ment in years 2 and 3 prior to adoption with employment in
years 2 and 3 following adoption; the final two columns
perform this comparison for years 3 and 4 prior to adoption.
In neither case does the choice of the pretreatment compar-
ison window substantially affect the magnitude or precision
of the main results. This suggests that our findings are
unlikely to be driven by spurious timing effects.42
V. Are All Workers Equally Affected?
Like their European counterparts, U.S. wrongful-
discharge laws disproportionately protect workers with
longer tenure and higher wages. Long-tenure workers can
more easily make a prima facie case that their jobs provided
an expectation of ongoing employment (in the case of the
implied-contract doctrine), or an expectation of future ben-
efits for current service (good-faith doctrine). In addition,
damage awards tend to be roughly proportional to prior
earnings, particularly in implied-contract cases. Hence high-
wage workers have a greater incentive to litigate, and
attorneys working on a contingency basis have a greater
incentive to take their cases.43 Because the protections
offered by wrongful-discharge doctrines are not equally
distributed among worker groups, we explore here whether
the employment impacts also differ among demographic
subgroups, defined by gender, education, and age. In table 5,
we take two cuts at the estimation. Panel A presents em-
ployment impacts in years 1 and 2 following adoption (that
is, 13–36 months after adoption—our baseline specifica-
tion). Panel B presents longer-term results for employment
effects in years 4 and 5 following adoption.
The results in panel A for short-term impacts confirm that
the implied-contract doctrine appears to reduce employment
rates for almost all the identified demographic groups. But
the effect is not uniform across groups. The largest impacts
are found for less-educated (high school or less) workers,
with impacts ranging from 1.6 to 1.7 for men and from
2.2 to 2.6 for women. In addition to the implied-contract
effects, we find some limited evidence (large point estimates
and large standard errors) that the good-faith exception also
reduces employment rates. But this impact only appears
robust for older women.
These short-term results are consistent with OECD stud-
ies that find that employment protections tend to differen-
tially harm employment of females, less-experienced work-
ers, and less-skilled workers (Bertola, Blau, & Khan, 2002;
OECD, 1999). Yet these results appear something of a
puzzle in the U.S. context. Because the wrongful-discharge
doctrines studied here increase the expected cost of employ-
ing high-tenure, high-wage workers, these laws should, over
the longer term, lower the employment and earnings of
41 The business press likely contributed to the sense of alarm. A 1985
Business Week cover article entitled “The Revolution in Employee Rights”
stated, “To minimize liability, corporations have to treat each dismissal as
though it were under a ‘just cause’ provision of a contract” (Hoerr et al.,
1985). Even under the broadest reading of the case law in 1985, this
statement would have been true in only the seven states that recognized
the good-faith exception.
42 One further concern is that if recent U.S. immigrants are unlikely to
take advantage of employment protections, the results might be weakened
by large concentrations of immigrant workers in certain states. To explore
this concern, we reestimated all models in table 1 for employment and
earnings excluding the six high-immigration states that contain the ma-
jority of the nation’s total foreign-born population: CA, FL, IL, NY, NJ,
and TX. These results are qualitatively identical to the main table 1
findings (table available from the authors).
43 Dertouzos, Holland, and Ebener (1988) find that plaintiffs in wrongful-
discharge cases typically are male (69%), hold executive or managerial
positions (53%), have 6 or more years of tenure (48%), and earn consid-
erably above the median wage.
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protected groups and raise the demand for workers who are
close substitutes—low-wage and short-tenure employees
who are unlikely to (successfully) litigate.44
Panel B of table 5 examines the evidence for longer-term
impacts. Notably, longer-term impacts for younger and less
educated workers appear less negative than the short-term
impacts presented in panel A, whereas longer-term impacts
for older and better-educated workers appear more negative.
In fact, for both sexes and both education categories, the
point estimate for the employment reduction among older
workers is larger than for younger workers. This suggests
that the larger short-term impacts for low-wage workers
seen in panel A may be explained by their high employment
flow rates; reductions in hiring will first reduce employment
of groups who enter and exit employment frequently.45 But
this discrepancy appears transitory. Over the longer term,
negative employment consequences appear to accrue for
those most protected by the wrongful-discharge doctrines.
Though we lack sufficient precision to conclude that high-
wage workers were differentially harmed, there is no evi-
dence that the long-term employment costs were dispropor-
tionately borne by low-wage workers.
VI. Robustness Tests: Alternative Data Sources and
Outcome Measures
Our analysis so far relies exclusively on the CPS to measure
employment outcomes. This presents two limitations. One is
that the CPS does not span the entire time period of interest for
our study. The second is that though the CPS is ideal for
measuring employment levels, it is not suitable for analyzing
worker flows, which should also be affected by employment
protections. We address both of these limitations here.
A. Employment Estimates Using Establishment-Based Data
Although most precedent-setting wrongful-discharge
cases were decided in the 1980s, some state courts adopted
public policy, implied-contract, and good-faith exceptions
before then (in 1959, 1976, and 1974 respectively). The
monthly CPS employment data series, which begins in
1978, does not cover these early adoptions. A second limi-
tation of the CPS, as a household survey, is that it may not
provide as precise an estimate of state employment levels as
an establishment-based survey. To partly rectify both limi-
tations, we supplement the CPS estimates with data from the
44 This may indeed be what occurred with the surge in demand for
temporary help employment in states adopting the implied-contract ex-
ceptions (Miles, 2000; Autor, 2003).
45 Also notably, the point estimates for longer-term employment effects
are larger for females than males. We do not believe this pattern reflects
gender differences in litigiousness. A 1988 study by Dertouzos, Holland,
and Ebener found that women were 31% of California wrongful-discharge
plaintiffs between 1980 and 1986. Our Current Population Survey data
indicate that 44% of California workers were women in those years.
TABLE 5.— ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF WRONGFUL-DISCHARGE LAWS ON LOG EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIOS BY GENDER, AGE, AND EDUCATION
SUBGROUPS, 1978–1999*
Doctrine
Males Females
 High School  Some College  High School  Some College
18–39 40–64 18–39 40–64 18–39 40–64 18–39 40–64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Years 2,3 Following Adoption Relative to 2 Years Prior to Adoption
Implied 1.60 1.73 0.63 0.68 2.17 2.62 1.39 0.23
contract (0.81) (0.44) (0.40) (0.55) (0.89) (0.91) (0.55) (0.62)
Public policy 0.20 0.50 0.04 0.24 0.17 0.31 1.22 0.24
(0.84) (0.65) (0.44) (0.59) (0.86) (0.89) (0.52) (1.04)
Good faith 2.69 1.07 0.22 0.78 1.88 0.22 1.13 3.50
(1.47) (1.10) (0.52) (0.56) (1.83) (1.36) (0.73) (1.37)
R2 0.702 0.643 0.621 0.505 0.782 0.761 0.697 0.684
n 10,465
B. Years 4,5 Following Adoption Relative to 2 Years Prior to Adoption
Implied contract 1.09 1.53 0.43 0.72 0.70 3.63 0.57 1.79
(0.93) (0.65) (0.41) (0.62) (1.01) (1.52) (0.71) (0.86)
Public policy 0.21 0.76 0.29 0.81 0.74 0.47 0.83 0.94
Public policy (0.70) (0.75) (0.47) (0.73) (1.22) (1.25) (0.76) (1.00)
Good faith 1.96 0.95 0.45 0.87 2.04 0.80 1.32 0.71
Good faith (1.07) (1.37) (0.64) (0.84) (2.03) (2.25) (1.41) (1.79)
R2 0.667 0.614 0.614 0.511 0.782 0.776 0.705 0.719
n 10,497
*Dependent variable: 100  In(employment/population).
Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlation within each state. Separate regressions in each column contrast employment of the specified demographic group in years
2 and 3 following adoption of a doctrine (panel A) or years 4 and 5 following adoption (panel B) with respect to the 2 years immediately prior to adoption of the doctrine. All models include state and year dummies
and region  year dummies. Samples, specifications, and weights are identical to table 2, column 4.
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Current Employment Statistics (CES) for the years 1970 to
1999.
The CES, collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), is drawn from a probability sample of approximately
350,000 establishments. Although these data are collected
monthly, new establishments enter the data with a signifi-
cant lag. To compensate for the undercount, BLS applies
bias-adjustment factors in each month and rebenchmarks
the CES totals to national employment in March of each
year.46 For our purposes, these bias adjustments have the
potential to undermine our state-by-month estimation strat-
egy used above if they obscure the response to the legal
shock that we try to discern in the monthly data. In other
words, the BLS adjustments may convey a picture of false
stability in the employment data that could induce strong
consistency bias over short time intervals. To address this
concern, we assemble month-of-March employment data
from the CES to form an annual state-by-year employment
count panel for 1970 through 1999. In so doing, we lose the
benefit of the monthly analysis that we employed on the
CPS data, while gaining the advantage of an establishment-
based data set covering a longer span of years.
Using the CES data, we estimate the following difference-
in-differences model for the natural logarithm of state em-
ployment:
ln Empsrt 7Lst 	s 
tr 	st 	st2 εsrt, (3)
where Lst is a vector of wrongful-discharge law dummies
that assume the value of 1 in the year following adoption
and after, and 
, 	, and  are vectors of year, state, and
region dummies (indicated by subscripts t, s, and r). To
allow for pronounced differential cross-state and cross-
region employment trends (Blanchard & Katz, 1992), our
preferred specification also controls for quadratic state
trends and interactions between four region dummies and
individual calendar-year dummies.
The first column of table 6 presents a model for state
employment for the years 1970 through 1999 estimated with
the CES data. Adoption of an implied-contract exception is
associated with a reduction in state employment of 2.6%,
which is statistically significant (t  2.2) and almost twice
as large as our main estimates (tables 1 and 2). There is
reason to treat this estimate with caution, however: the same
model also suggests that the good-faith doctrine raised state
employment levels by an implausibly large 7.5% (t  4.8).
This suggests the possibility of confounding state employ-
ment trends, a point we explore in greater detail in our
companion paper, ADS. To control for these trends, column
2 of the table adds quadratic state trends and regionyear
dummies. These variables reduce the magnitude of the
implied-contract effect to 1.0 percentage points (t  2.5),
46 Details on the sampling methods of the CES are found at http://
www.bls.gov/sae/790meth.htm (accessed August 21, 2004). TA
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similar to our main estimates. The good-faith and public
policy doctrines are now insignificant.47
We reestimate the column 2 model separately for manu-
facturing (column 3) and nonmanufacturing (column 4)
employment. In both sectors, the implied-contract doctrine
reduces employment levels by approximately 1% (signifi-
cant at the 5% level). Neither of the other two wrongful-
discharge laws is significant, and the sign for the public
policy doctrine is inconsistent.
To further test the comparability of the CES and CPS
results, we estimate a set of employment models using each
for the time interval for which both are available: 1978 to
1999. To increase comparability, we form an annual state-
level employment count using the CPS centered on March
of each calendar year.48 These models, in panel B of table 6,
yield highly comparable effects of the impact of wrongful-
discharge doctrines on state employment levels. After con-
trolling for state trends and region effects, we find that the
implied-contract doctrine is associated with an employment
decline of 1.1 to 1.9 percentage points overall, but with a
larger point estimate for manufacturing using the CPS data
(column 8). In the specification controlling for employment
trends, the good-faith doctrine is never significant, whereas
the public policy doctrine is occasionally negative and
significant.
We emphasize that the state  year estimation method-
ology in table 6 is less satisfactory than our short-panel
approach in previous tables. In particular, the variation
exploited has strong serial correlation and may be con-
founded with state and regional employment trends—issues
that we addressed above by varying the pre- and posttreat-
ment interval, contrasting short- and long-term impacts,
controlling flexibly for regional effects, and examining
multiple subperiods of the data. Nevertheless, the CES
results increase our confidence in the main findings.
B. Evidence on Employment Flows
As discussed in section I, theory makes ambiguous pre-
dictions about the short-run effect of wrongful-discharge
laws on employment levels. Protection that does not satisfy
Coasean efficiency should lower wages or employment or
both in the long run. But in the short run, firing restrictions
can either raise or lower employment, because they reduce
incentives to both hire and fire. Regardless of whether firing
restrictions raise or lower employment levels, they should
unambiguously reduce worker flows into and out of jobs.
Hence, we briefly explore here how wrongful-discharge
laws affect employment flows.
Our CPS data, formed from repeated cross sections of
households, are not suitable for this analysis.49 As an im-
perfect substitute, we exploit state-level employment flow
data from the Longitudinal Research Database (Davis,
Haltiwanger, & Schuh, 1996). The state-level LRD sample
is available only for 1973 through 1988 and only for the
manufacturing sector. A further limitation of the LRD it that
it does not measure true employment flows—that is, the
count of workers exiting and entering jobs. Instead, it
measures the sum of job losses at contracting establishments
(job destruction) and the sum of job gains at expanding
establishments (job creation), each normalized by total
manufacturing employment.
To examine the effects of wrongful-discharge laws on job
creation and destruction, we estimate a difference-
in-differences model,
Jst  
0
3
Lst    4  It  LawYRs  4
(4)
 
t 	s εst,
where the dependent variable is the job-flow measure for
manufacturing employment in state s over years t to t  1,
and Lst is a vector of wrongful-discharge doctrine dummies
that assume the value of 1 in the year a law is adopted, and
the variable LawYRs equals the year of a state’s adoption.
Vectors of time and state dummies, 
 and 	, control respec-
tively for aggregate shocks and mean cross-state differences
in the rate of job creation or destruction. All models are
weighted by average state shares of U.S. manufacturing
employment over 1973 to 1988.
Prior to estimating equation (4), we tabulate in the ap-
pendix (table A3) benchmark estimates of the state-level
relationship between job creation and destruction and em-
ployment growth in manufacturing. Despite the limitations
noted, the job-flow measures capture a substantial share of
the variation in manufacturing employment over time: 1
percentage point of job creation predicts employment
growth of 0.7 log points (t  16), and 1 percentage point of
job destruction predicts an employment decline of 0.8 log
points (t  24).50
Panel A of table 7 presents estimates of equation (4) for
job destruction. The initial model finds some evidence that
adopting a wrongful-discharge doctrine reduces manufac-
turing job destruction. Specifically, job destruction in the
first three years following adoption of any wrongful-
discharge law is between 0.2 and 0.6 percentage points
47 Because of the 30-year time span in these specifications, we control
flexibly for time trends using quadratic rather than (just) linear trends. If
instead we only use linear trends, the implied-contract coefficients are
unaffected, but the good-faith coefficients remain significantly positive in
some specifications.
48 Specifically, we form a centered average on March of each year using
CPS data for January through May.
49 Though the CPS can be used to track a subset of households over one
calendar year, the matched samples are problematic: job losers are dis-
proportionately likely to change residences and therefore exit the sample
(Welch, 1993; Madrian & Lefgren, 2000).
50 The estimates in table A3 are from a variant of equation (4) in which
the dependent variable is the state-level first difference in log manufac-
turing employment. Job creation and destruction are included on the right
side of the equation, and other control variables are as above.
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lower than prior to law adoption, though these point esti-
mates are not significant. Column 2 replaces the any-law
variables with separate indicator variables for each of the
three wrongful-discharge doctrines. Here, a somewhat
stronger pattern emerges. Job destruction declines notice-
ably—by around 0.7 to 0.8 percentage points—in years 2
and 3 following adoption of the implied contract exception,
though again, the point estimates are not significant at
conventional levels. There is no evidence of a decline in job
destruction in the years following adoption of either the
public policy or good-faith doctrines.
Panels B and C of table 7 repeat these estimates for job
creation and for gross job flows, the latter of which is the
sum of job creation and job destruction. In years 1 through
3 following adoption of an implied-contract exception, there
is some evidence of a slowdown in job creation and very
strong evidence of a reduction in gross job flows. The final
estimate indicates a sizable 1.2-percentage-point reduction
in gross job flows in the third year following adoption of the
implied-contract exception (t  3.2). The good-faith doc-
trine is also associated with a significant reduction in job
creation and a marginally significant decline in gross job
flows—but this result did not prove robust to inclusion of
four region-by-year dummy variables (not shown), and
hence we are not confident of its validity.51 For the public
policy doctrine, no clear pattern emerges.
Do these estimates support the inference that wrongful-
discharge laws reduced job flows? In the case of the implied-
contract doctrine, the answer appears to be a qualified yes.
In the years immediately following adoption of this doc-
trine, job creation appears to slow (albeit not significantly),
followed in years 2 and 3 by a significant reduction in job
destruction. Consistent with the evidence in table 4, these
estimates imply a dip in employment followed by a mod-
erate employment rebound. It bears emphasis that these
job-flow results do not correspond perfectly to our main
estimates; the estimated 0.5-percentage-point slowdown in
job creation is not large enough to account for the 0.9-
percentage-point reduction in manufacturing employment
estimated for the comparable time period (table 6, column
6). Given the many sources of slippage in the LRD data,
however, we believe this evidence supports the main re-
sults.52
VII. Conclusion
We find ourselves taking a middle position between those
who suggest that the adoption of exceptions to employment
at will has had a major negative impact on employment
(particularly Dertouzos & Karoly, 1992) and those who find
that the exceptions have had no impact (Miles, 2000). We
find a statistically significant negative impact on employ-
ment, but it emanates from only one of the legal excep-
tions—the implied-contract doctrine—and its adoption
causes a decline of 0.8% to 1.7% in the ratio of employment
to population, which is between one-third and one-fifth the
estimated magnitude offered by Dertouzos and Karoly
(1992). Although the matter can never be free from doubt in
statistical studies of this kind, the robustness of our findings
across specifications, demographic groups, time periods,
and data sources suggests that our findings reflect a causal
effect of adoption of the implied-contract exception.
We stress that our paper does not attempt to provide an
overall assessment of wrongful-discharge laws. We have not
offered any evaluation of the benefits of such laws to
workers and the public. The fact that there is some reduction
51 A table of results is available from the authors.
52 Complementing this evidence, Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004, tables 3,
4) find that adoption of wrongful-discharge doctrines—particularly the
implied-contract and good-faith exceptions—significantly slowed the rate
of job accession for unemployed workers in adopting states. This supports
the conclusion that adoption of these doctrines dampened labor market
flows.
TABLE 7.—ESTIMATED IMPACT OF WRONGFUL-DISCHARGE LAWS ON ANNUAL JOB FLOWS IN MANUFACTURING, 1973 TO 1988*
Time relative
to (years) law
adoption
A. Job Destruction B. Job Creation C. Gross Flows: Job Destruction  Job Creation
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Any
Implied
Contract
Public
Policy
Good
Faith Any
Implied
Contract
Public
Policy
Good
Faith Any
Implied
Contract
Public
Policy
Good
Faith
0 0.44 0.25 0.69 0.32 0.23 0.08 0.45 1.29 0.21 0.33 0.24 0.98
(0.40) (0.34) (0.44) (0.37) (0.29) (0.27) (0.26) (0.69) (0.47) (0.39) (0.47) (0.82)
1 0.21 0.17 0.01 1.09 0.19 0.35 0.14 1.06 0.39 0.18 0.13 0.02
(0.48) (0.47) (0.58) (0.37) (0.46) (0.40) (0.34) (0.65) (0.53) (0.33) (0.65) (0.59)
2 0.63 0.77 0.17 0.56 0.31 0.10 0.35 0.39 0.32 0.87 0.18 0.95
(0.47) (0.59) (0.51) (0.89) (0.45) (0.39) (0.36) (0.60) (0.41) (0.55) (0.46) (0.55)
3 0.08 0.71 1.00 0.27 0.50 0.50 0.58 1.10 0.42 1.22 0.41 0.83
(0.85) (0.57) (0.91) (0.78) (0.48) (0.41) (0.50) (0.77) (0.50) (0.38) (0.53) (0.51)
R2 0.755 0.762 0.774 0.783 0.742 0.751
*Dependent variable: percentage-point changes in state manufacturing employment at contracting and expanding plants.
n  752 observations (47 states  16 years). Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlations within each state. Each numbered column is from a separate OLS regression
of manufacturing employment flows by state and calendar year on leads and lags of wrongful-discharge law adoption. All models include state and year dummies and a dummy indicating 4 years following law
adoption. Job creation (destruction) is the absolute value of the employment-weighted mean percentage-point change in employment in manufacturing plants experiencing employment increases (declines). All
estimates are weighted by state mean share of national manufacturing employment over 1973–1988. Alaska, Rhode Island, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia are excluded from estimates. Data are from Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), and are available for download at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/haltiwanger/download.htm.
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in employment—for women, younger workers, and less-
educated men in the short term, and potentially for older and
more educated workers in the longer term—underscores
that legal protections do not come without cost.
Those steeped in the view that low transaction costs
would give rise to a Coasean invariance prediction might be
surprised by the finding that the implied-contract doctrine
reduces employment when it would seem that simple
changes to personnel policies could easily negate the legal
effectiveness of this exception. Conversely, others might see
the apparent inability to contract costlessly around legal
rules as further confirmation that the invariance prediction
of the Coase theorem frequently does not obtain in labor
markets (Donohue, 1989). Still, the evidence that the de-
pressing employment impact of the implied-contract doc-
trine dissipated after six or seven years may suggest that
over time employers were able to circumvent the costs of
the law or came to realize that these costs would be small.
Part of the reason for the initial drop in employment might
have been uncertainty about how far courts would push
these exceptions, so that it took time for that information to
be revealed and for employers to contract around the ex-
ception (which they could certainly do more readily with
respect to new hires than with incumbent workers).
Our finding that the implied-contract exception generated
at least short-term employment drops without correspond-
ing drops in wages merits discussion. A simple supply-and-
demand model would suggest that by raising total employ-
ment costs, adoption of the implied-contract doctrine should
have caused an inward shift in labor demand, leading to
lower employment and wage levels. Moreover, if workers
valued the protection provided by this doctrine, total labor
supply should have shifted outward, mitigating the employ-
ment effect but augmenting the wage effect. In other words,
the observed drop in employment suggests a backward
demand shift, which should have lowered wages, and any
supply stimulus should only have accentuated the wage
drop.
Why then did wages not fall, even during the period when
employment fell? A number of possibilities must be consid-
ered. First, an outward supply shift that would accentuate a
drop in wages probably did not occur, because workers did
not greatly value the benefit of the implied-contract excep-
tion. This could occur if the expected benefit to the worker
was in fact low, perhaps because much of the money
changing hands in wrongful-discharge cases would be paid
to attorneys. Alternatively, workers might not perceive a
benefit from such judicial decisions because, as consider-
able evidence suggests, they tend to believe that they al-
ready are protected against unjust dismissal, even when they
clearly are not. According to Kim (1997), “workers consis-
tently overestimate their legal rights, with overwhelming
majorities (as high as 89%) believing that they are legally
protected against arbitrary and unjust discharges when in
fact they can be dismissed at will.”
A second possibility is that the violation of the predic-
tions of the simple supply-and-demand framework in this
context is more fundamental. In contrast to this framework,
standard flow models of the labor market imply that em-
ployment protections raise wages (and reduce employment)
by increasing workers’ bargaining power (cf. Blanchard &
Portugal, 2001). The logic of this argument is that firing
costs induce employers to accept higher wage demands
because the alternative of laying off workers who are
pushing for higher wages would trigger the firing cost.
Hence, in aggregate, employment protection creates two
countervailing effects on wage levels: by shifting labor
demand inward, it puts downward pressure on wages; by
providing incumbent workers with enhanced bargaining
power, it exerts upward pressure. According to the evidence
presented here, the net effect of these two influences for
recent wrongful-discharge protections adopted in the United
States is to lower employment modestly while leaving
overall wage levels unchanged.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1.—WRONGFUL-DISCHARGE LAWS BY REGION, STATE, AND YEAR*
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
New England
Connecticut P1 G6 P G P G
Maine C11 C C C C C
Massachusetts G7 G G P5 G P G P G
New Hampshire P2 G2 P G P G P G P G P G P G5 P P
Rhode Island
Vermont
Middle Atlantic
New Jersey P7 P P
New York C11
Pennsylvania P3 P P P P P P P P
East North Central
Illinois C12 C C C C P12 C P C P C P C P
Indiana P5 P P P P P P P P P
Michigan P6 P P P C6 P C P C P
Ohio C4
Wisconsin P1 P P
West North Central
Iowa
Kansas P6 P
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
South Atlantic
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Maryland P7 P
North Carolina
South Carolina
Virginia
West Virginia P7 P P P P
East South Central
Alabama
Kentucky
Mississippi
Tennessee C11 C
West South Central
Arkansas P3 P P
Louisiana
Oklahoma C12 C C C C C C
Texas
Mountain
Arizona
Colorado
Idaho C4 P4 C P C P C P C P C P
Montana P1 P P G1
Nevada
New Mexico C2 C C
Utah
Wyoming
Pacific
Alaska
California P P C3 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P G10 C P G C P G
Hawaii P10
Oregon P6 P P C3 P C P C P C P C P
Washington C8 C C C C C
*Key: C, implied contract; P, public policy; G, good faith. (Month of adoption or removal indicated by numbers 1–12.)
Source: Authors’ analysis of case law.
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TABLE A1.—(CONTINUED)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
P G P G C10 P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
P G P G P G P G P G C5 P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
P P P P P C8 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C8 C P9 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
P P C5 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
P P P P C8 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C C C C C C C C P3 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
P P C6 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
P7 P C11 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
P C8 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C4 C C C P11 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C1 C C P11 C P C P C2 P P P P P P P P P P P P
C11 C C C C P11 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C2 C C C P11 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C4 C C C C C P12 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
P3 G4 P G P G P G P G P G P G P G
P P C1 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
P5 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
P11 P C6 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C9 C C P6 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
P P P C4 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C7 C C C C C C C C C C C C
C8 P11 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
P7 P P P P C6 P CP CP C P C P C P C P C P
C C P8 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
P C6 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
G1 G
C C C G5 C G C G C G C P2 G2 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
P6 C4 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C6 C4 P6 G6 P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G
C10 C C P9 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C P C P C P C P C P C P C P G8 C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
P G P G P G P G C6 P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
C8 C P1 C P C P C P G2 C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
C P7 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C5 C C C P3 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C8 C C C C P7 C P C P C P C P C P G1 C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
C5 G5 C G C G C P2 G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
P P P C8 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
C C P7 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
*Key: C, implied contract; P, public policy; G, good faith. (Month of adoption indicated by numbers 1–12.)
Source: Authors’ analysis of case law.
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TABLE A3.—RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING, 1973 TO 1988*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Job creation 0.74 0.73
(0.05) (0.05)
Job destruction 0.83 0.81
(0.03) (0.04)
Gross: creation  destruction 0.45 0.45
(0.06) (0.06)
Net: creation  destruction 0.79 0.78
(0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.927 0.939 0.793 0.845 0.926 0.939
Region  year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
*Dependent variable: 100   ln(state manufacturing employment).
n  752 observations (47 states  16 years). Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlations within each state. Each numbered column is from a separate OLS regression
of 100 times the annual change in log state manufacturing employment on job creation (destruction), defined as the absolute value of the employment-weighted mean percentage-point change in employment in
manufacturing plants experiencing employment increases (declines). All models include state and year dummies. Models in even-numbered columns additionally contain interactions between four Census geographic
regions and calendar year dummies. Estimates are weighted by state mean share of national manufacturing employment over 1973–1988. Alaska, Rhode Island, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia are excluded
from estimates. Data are from Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996).
TABLE A2.—DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF WRONGFUL-DISCHARGE LAWS ON STATE EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIO AND
HOURLY EARNINGS, 1978–1999: MODELS EXCLUDING PREVIOUSLY TREATED STATE-MONTH OBSERVATIONS FROM THE CONTROL SAMPLE
Doctrine
A. 100  ln(Employment/Population): 1978–1999 B. 100  ln(Hourly Wage): 1979–1999
All Employment Manufacturing Nonmanufacturing All Employment Manufacturing Nonmanufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2)
Implied 1.83 1.57 2.97 2.56 1.29 1.20 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.53 0.65 0.57
contract (0.58) (0.44) (1.75) (1.48) (0.84) (0.51) (0.84) (0.73) (0.72) (0.58) (0.95) (0.81)
R2 0.870 0.894 0.949 0.954 0.928 0.947 0.235 0.235 0.326 0.327 0.218 0.219
n 5,404 5,404 5,404 1,402,130 303,697 1,098,433
Public policy 0.30 0.04 1.37 0.18 0.68 0.03 0.71 0.48 0.14 0.11 1.00 0.77
(0.81) (0.62) (1.91) (1.69) (0.90) (0.63) (0.58) (0.57) (0.74) (0.53) (0.63) (0.63)
R2 0.827 0.865 0.947 0.955 0.915 0.938 0.236 0.237 0.327 0.327 0.221 0.221
n 5,640 5,640 5,640 1,565,684 330,649 1,235,035
Good faith 0.33 0.44 5.94 2.13 1.93 0.29 1.34 0.45 2.21 1.67 1.35 0.30
(0.63) (0.81) (1.93) (2.20) (0.83) (1.02) (1.43) (1.75) (1.19) (1.42) (1.59) (1.79)
R2 0.872 0.897 0.930 0.943 0.920 0.938 0.230 0.230 0.311 0.312 0.217 0.218
n 6,832 6,832 6,832 1,815,262 371,884 1,443,378
Region  year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Samples and models are identical to table 1 except that state-month observations from states that have already adopted a law during the sample period are not used in the control-state sample in months 37
following law adoption. For details, see notes to table 1 and footnote 29 in the text.
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